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Abstract
Traditional cryptographic storage uses encryption to ensure confidentiality of file data.
However, encryption can prevent efficient random access to file data. Moreover, no
cryptographic storage file system allows file sharing with similar semantics to UNIX
group sharing. The Cryptographic Storage File System (Cepheus) provides confiden-
tiality and integrity of data while enabling efficient random access and file sharing
using mechanisms similar to UNIX groups. Cepheus uses a delayed-write-encryption
policy for caching, delayed re-encryption for distributed re-encryption, and a hash
tree structure beneath the inode for integrity. While maintaining confidentiality and
integrity, the cost of reading a block is 0(1) amortized over a sequential read of the
entire file of n blocks. Writes execute in worst-case O(log n) time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Very frequently, a user of crypt will forget to remove a cleartext file after
producing an encrypted version. Such cleartext can only be described as
'gold'[25]. -Robert H. Morris
Cryptographic storage file systems can protect long-term information from unau-
thorized disclosure and modification. This thesis proposes the Cryptographic Storage
File System (CSFS - pronounced Cepheus), a file system to provide secure group
sharing and efficient random access'. Cepheus expands upon existing cryptographic
file system models by cryptographically enforcing traditional UNIX@ file system se-
mantics without imposing significant performance penalties2
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 gives a general background on the
UNIX file system, analyzes several existing cryptographic storage file systems, and
motivates research in cryptographic storage. Chapter 2 outlines our requirements for
Cepheus and states our assumptions of trust. Chapter 3 presents our design to satisfy
the constraints of chapter 2. Chapter 4 describes the implementation details. Chap-
ter 5 summarizes future directions and unresolved questions regarding cryptographic
storage. Finally, chapter 6 concludes our results.
'Cepheus was the king of Ethiopia, husband of Cassiopeia, father of Andromeda, and fellow
Argonaut with Jason. His name is also the only decent thing that sounds at all like Cepheus.
2UNIX is a registered trademark licensed exclusively through X/Open Company Ltd.
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1.1 Background: UNIX File Systems
This section describes the basic ideas and terminology behind a simplified UNIX file
system. We explain the file system details necessary to understand the rest of this
document. For more precise definitions, see the Berkeley Fast File System paper[23].
If you are already familiar with file system internals, you can skip ahead to the next
section.
To introduce the concepts in the UNIX file system, we begin with with a list
of terminology. A file is the basic unit of storage in a file system. For instance,
/etc/passwd is a name which refers to a file containing account information as data.
A file system consists of software to store and retrieve files.
A partition refers to the stored data referenced by a file system. It typically resides
on a disk consisting of rotating magnetic platters. Partitions are also known as disk
partitions or volumes. Partitions divide into many consecutive blocks typically of a
fixed size (e.g., 4KB). The block I/O interface contains methods to manipulate a
partition down to the granularity of a block. That is, one cannot write a single byte
to a partition. Rather, one must rewrite the entire block that contains the changed
byte. Regions of blocks fall into several structures: a superblock, a freemap, an inode
table, and data blocks. Figure 1-1 shows the arrangement of structures on a partition.
We explain each structure below.
Disk
Superblock Freemap Inode Table Data
Figure 1-1: The layout of data and metadata on the physical disk.
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Superblock
The superblock acts as a road map to the rest of the disk partition. It keeps track of
critical information necessary to mount the file system. For instance, you might find
the following in a superblock:
" magic number
" number of blocks
* location of freemap
" location of inode table
" number of free inodes
" location of data blocks
" last time of a file system consistency check
" number of mounts since last consistency check
* dirty bit
The information in the superblock is established during initialization of the parti-
tion. Should the partition fall into an inconsistent state (e.g., from a power failure),
the superblock can help to reconstruct the disk partition.
The superblock also records a magic number which can help to determine whether
or not the data are valid. If this magic number is not intact, we know something
disturbed the superblock. It is also useful to check whether values in the superblock
make sense. For example, if the location of the inode table is past the end of the disk,
we can assume that corruption has occurred and the superblock data should not be
used.
The mount count and the dirty bit signal mandatory consistency checks. The
mount count keeps track of how many times we have remounted the partition. Typ-
ically there is a threshold number of mounts before a mandatory consistency check
takes place. We set the dirty bit during every mount operation. During a shutdown,
the file system clears the dirty bit to denote a cleanly unmounted partition. If the
file system finds a set dirty bit when mounting a partition, it knows that the file
system was shut down unexpectedly. An investigation would proceed to check the
15
consistency of the partition. The fsck program attempts to recover data which may
have been corrupted by partially completed operations.
Freemap
The freemap follows the superblock. It contains a simple table with one bit repre-
senting each block of the disk partition. Bit i in the freemap indicates whether block
i is currently free. In this way, the file system can readily find free blocks without
having to search the entire disk. There are more scalable ways of keeping track of
free blocks. For instance, XFS uses a B+ tree to keep track of extents of contiguous
data[40].
Inode Table
Storage in a file system falls into two categories: data and metadata. Data make up
the essential cargo of a file system. The whole point of a file system is to store data
in an easily retrievable fashion. Metadata consist of the bookkeeping necessary to
maintain the file system. For instance, a file in the UNIX file system is represented
by an inode which contains metadata necessary to locate the contents of the file. An
inode stores the attributes and pointers to data of one file. The inode table consists
of a sequence of blocks which contain all the inodes. Since inodes are often statically
allocated during initialization, the number of inodes corresponds to the maximum
number of files that can exist. Allowing a large number of inodes provides for the
storage of many files, but requires more space for the inode table. However, modern
file systems allow some flexibility with dynamically allocated inodes. An inode often
has the following attributes:
" index number
* access rights
" reference count
" file type
" generation number for NFS file handles
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" most recent access time
" most recent modification time
* creation time
" owner
* group
* file size
The access rights define read, write, and execute permissions for the owner, group,
and others. The reference count keeps track of the number of directory entries pointing
to an inode. When this number reaches zero, the file system can release the inode and
data. The file type denotes how to interpret the data of the file. Common file types
include: regular file, directory, and symbolic link. The generation number becomes
useful when using network file systems. It helps to prevent client workstations from
accidentally overwriting changes made by another client.
Direct Pointers
Direct Pointers -+
Attributes - -
D * Singly Indirect Pointers
Direct-
Direct'
Figure 1-2: The inode contains file attributes and pointers to data blocks. Singly and
doubly indirect blocks allow a small inode to address a large amount of file data.
In addition to keeping attributes, an inode maintains pointers to data blocks
as shown in figure 1-2. Data pointers are either direct, singly indirect, or doubly
indirect. Indirect pointers allow inodes to remain relatively small3 . A singly indirect
pointer references a data block which contains many direct pointers. Doubly indirect
3Because common operations such as is read several inodes at a time without needing data
pointers, the inodes need to be small.
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pointers work similarly. Hence, an inode can address large amounts of data while
directly housing only a small number of pointers.
Inode #1 Directory Entries for/ Inode #42 Inode #22
filenamne inode
Attributes Attributes Attributes
(directory) (hard link) (symbolic link)
Data Pointers Data Pointers ~ Data Pointers /tmp/bar.c
Figure 1-3: A complex example of a directory mapping file names to inodes. Thick
boxes represent data blocks while thin boxes represent inodes.
Directories
Note that an inode has no location for a file name. Rather, directories keep track
of the file name to inode mapping. In figure 1-3, inode #1 represents the root di-
rectory. In the context of this directory, f ile1.txt and foo. c refer to inodes #22
and #42 respectively. f oo. c represents a typical hard link to an inode. A hard link
points directly to an inode which in turn points to the file data. A second kind of
link, a symbolic link, involves an extra level of indirection. The associated file data
actually reference a path to another file name as in the case of inode #22. The path
/f ilel. txt resolves to the path /tmp/bar. c. Note that a symbolic link may point to
any file path, whereas a hard link can only point to inodes within the same partition.
1.2 Motivation
We motivate the use of cryptographic storage through several examples and trends.
Cryptographic file systems offer several security advantages over existing information
protection methods. For instance, manual file encryption is cumbersome. One may
encrypt a file and then decrypt whenever necessary. However, this clearly offers no
transparency to the user. Moreover, manual file encryption protects only what the
user knows about. Manual file encryption cannot protect temporary files or swapped
18
out memory. Building cryptography into a file system allows transparent operation
and helps prevent such accidental disclosure.
Reportedly 20,000 credit card numbers were stolen from Netcom, a leading In-
ternet service provider[21]. Had a cryptographic file system been used to store the
information, the incident may have been prevented. Tony Liss and Paul Tipton ex-
perienced information theft of their draft paper on the top quark[19]. After storing
the draft in an obscure directory, another person at Fermilab managed to read the
file. Shortly thereafter, some data were posted in a facetious report to an electronic
bulletin board. Although the incident was minor, one learns that "security through
obscurity" alone is not sufficient and existing file systems are ineffective against the
insider threat.
Some researchers argue that a machine should cryptographically protect all of its
resources (e.g., memory or the bus). However, today's general-purpose workstations
cannot easily protect its resources against malicious local users. For instance, emacs
run over an X connection would disclose the text of a document. There is cleartext
Interprocess Communication (IPC) between the X server and X client. Moreover,
research has yet to produce cryptographic protection of memory with tolerable access
delays. For instance, the MemGuard program protects individual words in memory.
The overhead ranges from several thousand to several hundred thousand percent of a
normal memory access[10]. The benefit of securing every part of a client workstation
is much less than gained from simply using a cryptographic file system and trusting
the local machine.
According to Ross Anderson, insiders cause the majority of problems in the UK
medical record system[1]. A recent ASIS report says that 75% of intellectual property
theft involved an insider with a trusted relationship[26]. Marcus Ranum gives a
high estimate that 80% of recorded security incidents are inside jobs[30]. While the
exact percentage of insider influence varies greatly, one would agree that insiders
are responsible for a significant portion, if not the majority, of privacy invasions.
A cryptographic file system can transparently protect against many inside attacks.
Bribing a system administrator would no longer be of use. Even if an adversary
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managed to obtain encrypted files, the files are useless without the key. This separates
the responsibility of storage management from information privacy[32].
Network traffic encryption can prevent outside attacks, but does little to prevent
inside attacks. Traffic encryption does nothing to prevent a file system adminis-
trator from abusing privileges. On the other hand, cryptographic storage provides
truly end-to-end encryption[33]. Cryptographically secure storage decreases the value
gained from traffic encryption. Moreover, file servers become the bottlenecks in traf-
fic encryption, especially when public key cryptography is involved. For every client
workstation, the file server will have to perform encryption and decryption of data.
In cryptographic storage, however, much of the computation moves to the client side,
thereby removing bottlenecks from the server. The clients perform all the encryption
and decryption. The file server must only check for authentication and authorization
of requests.
Cryptographic storage can also provide for secure recovery of lost data. One could
send in a hard drive for repair without worrying about leakage of information[32]. The
data recovery can take place without compromising confidentiality. Another good
reason to use a cryptographic file system is for protection against your computer or
hard disk being lost or stolen. This is especially true for laptops or other mobile
machines[9].
1.3 Focus
Most research in cryptographic file systems centers on fast and reliable storage for
a single user. In addition to providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability,
Cepheus focuses on group sharing and random access.
1.3.1 Group Sharing
Existing cryptographic file systems either do not address file sharing or discourage
file sharing. We recognize that group sharing in the UNIX file system is rare, but
allowing sharing adds tremendous power[38]. If sharing in the UNIX file system were
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augmented with semantics similar to that of access control lists (ACLs) in AFS, we
believe sharing would be more widely used. Currently, creation and membership
maintenance in the UNIX file system and Sun's Network File System require inter-
vention by a system administrator. Moreover, a user can be active in just one group
at a time, and a file can have permissions for just one group. Cepheus allows secure
sharing within cryptographic storage.
1.3.2 Random Access
Encryption adds an obvious overhead to reading and writing files. Cepheus exploits
caches, delayed re-encryption, and encryption modes to diffuse the impact of encryp-
tion. Much of the motivation for efficient random access comes from research on
incremental cryptography[3].
1.4 Related Work: Case Studies
A cryptographic file system does everything a traditional file system does, but in a
secure manner. For instance, file data may be kept confidential or protected from
unauthorized modification. Under reasonable cryptographic assumptions (e.g., it is
computationally infeasible to decrypt a block without the key), we can prove proper-
ties of security.
Cryptographic file systems come in two varieties. Cryptographic network file sys-
tems protect the information sent between a user's workstation and the file server.
For instance, Dave Mazieres' Secure File System stores plaintext on the file server,
but protects the link to the client[22]. Cryptographic network file systems are ap-
propriate when the file server is trusted not to disclose or alter stored data. On the
other hand, cryptographic storage file systems keep files encrypted on the file server.
The users need not trust the file server to protect confidentiality. Below we focus our
case studies on cryptographic storage file systems.
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1.4.1 Cryptographic File System
The Cryptographic File System (CFS) introduced a relatively robust cryptographic
storage system for the UNIX operating system[4]. Matt Blaze from AT&T Bell Lab-
oratories developed CFS in 1993. Development continues, but not on a regular basis.
CFS pushes confidentiality into data storage. Although several other file systems
had already incorporated cryptography to secure network file transmissions, CFS is
the first well-documented UNIX cryptographic storage file system. CFS investigates
the question of where encryption should be placed in a file system: at the low-level
hardware or the user-level. Several goals guided the CFS design including the issues
of key management, transparency, and portability.
In a manual file encryption system, the user inputs a password or key whenever
encryption or decryption takes place. Instead of requiring a password for each en-
cryption operation, CFS asks the user once per login for a password. This password
acts as a seed to compute a key stream. CFS eliminates the problem of re-entering
passwords, but can generate new difficulties in password management. A user may
need to remember several passwords to protect unrelated directories.
Transparent performance and access semantics allow users to perform necessary
tasks without knowledge of or interference from the underlying cryptography. That is,
one should not notice significant differences from a traditional UNIX file system. CFS
succeeds in hiding most of the cryptography. When using one encryption password,
CFS does not incur noticeable performance penalties after an initial pause to compute
the key stream. Moreover, access semantics work as in a normal UNIX file system.
However, simultaneous use of several passwords will cause many key streams to be
loaded into memory. In the extreme case, CFS can cause thrashing by filling up all
memory with key streams.
Because CFS runs in user mode, no kernel modification is necessary to use CFS
(see figure 1-4). Moreover, the code has been ported to several UNIX flavors including
SunOS and Linux. On the other hand, if CFS were implemented in the kernel itself,
much context switching could be avoided. But an in-kernel implementation would
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have prevented the ease of portability.
CFS provides end-to-end encryption from the client back to the client. All en-
cryption operations take place on the client machine. The server is trusted to reliably
store and retrieve information and not to alter storage. The user must completely
trust the client machine and anyone who can gain root access on the client machine.
For instance, the root user could access the password or key stream by searching
/dev/kmem.
User Programs CFS Daemon
NFS Loopback Encryption/Decryption Engine
read /crypt/foo.c
.... ...............-...-.. -System Call Interface
NFS Client - - UNIX FS Client
Virtual File System (VFS)
Local or Remote Disk
Figure 1-4: This diagram of CFS is based on Blaze's paper and an article on cryp-
tographic file systems[4, 35]. Dashed lines represent a confidential area protected by
encryption.
Directories serve as the atomic level of access protection. To reduce the number of
key streams, CFS tags an entire directory with one key. That is, one specifies access
permissions to files grouped together in a directory rather than to individual files.
This differs from traditional UNIX file systems, but is similar to access semantics of
the Andrew File System (AFS).
CFS protects data, file names, and symbolic links from disclosure outside the
trusted computing base. However, no protection is given to metadata such as file
sizes and time stamps. This allows existing utilities such as the f sck partition sal-
vaging program to perform normally. CFS offers no protection against unauthorized
modification. If a bit of the stored ciphertext flips, the user might notice a corrupted
64-byte block of plaintext. The goals of the CFS design do not include emergency
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Figure 1-5: In Blaze's OFB+ECB mode, the OFB mode first computes intermediate
plaintext blocks IP offline. When a plaintext block P needs encryption, it is first
XORed with IP, IV, and a function of the block number and seed. This is encrypted
in ECB mode for the final ciphertext.
key recovery or protection against denial of service.
Under the hood CFS employs the DES block cipher in Output-Feedback and
Electronic Codebook (OFB+ECB) mode to create a key stream from a password.
Figure 1-5 depicts this operation. All files in a directory use the same key, but each
file has its own initialization vector (IV) tied to the inode number. CFS crunches the
password into two 56-bit DES keys which determine the key stream in the OFB+ECB
mode. By computing the key stream offline, CFS trades memory for speed. To my
knowledge, no literature analyzes the OFB+ECB mode. However, Yoav Yerushalmi
independently developed a similar OFB+ECB mode as shown in figure 1-6[43]. The
OFB+ECB method is considered a natural solution.
For individual users, CFS is stable, easy to use, and transparent. However, some
desirable goals are not addressed. The notion of file sharing does not exist. In
order to share a directory, a user must disclose the directory key. In fact, the CFS
documentation states, "The system is designed to be installed on individual single-
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Figure 1-6: In Yerushalmi's OFB+ECB mode, the OFB mode first computes inter-
mediate plaintext blocks IP offline, as is done in Blaze's mode. When a plaintext
block P needs encryption, it is first encrypted in ECB mode, then XORed with 1P.
This allows for easier incremental changes.
user workstations. You really should not install it on a shared file or compute [sic]
server, even though such a configuration is technically possible."
Because passwords directly encrypt files, CFS has the advantage that only the
holder of the password can access files. No key ring waits to be stolen by an adver-
sary. However, this makes re-encryption and emergency access difficult. No native
password changing procedures exist. You would have to copy the appropriate files to
a new directory, which would re-encrypt the files with a new password. In chapter
3, we explain a delayed re-encryption technique to avoid some of this latency. Emer-
gency access or key escrow could help recover lost passwords, but it would also give
adversaries an easier task to acquire a key (e.g., through bribery or the "rubber-hose"
method).
Blaze explains several other important issues in two papers concerning his cryp-
tographic file system[4, 5]. Anyone wishing to research cryptographic file systems
should read these papers.
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1.4.2 Secure FileSystem
The Secure FileSystem (SFS) implements a cryptographic storage file system for
MS-DOS 4 . Despite its underlying operation system, SFS has a surprising number of
creative and useful features. The primary goal of SFS is to protect bulk data stored
on a disk[13]. Peter Gutmann, a graduate student at the University of Auckland in
New Zealand, developed SFS until 1995. Although discussion about SFS appears
occasionally in Usenet, all development has ceased. As Gutmann also worked with
the early developers of PGP, a lot of paranoia rubbed off onto SFS. For instance, the
SFS documentation explains that "35 separate overwrite passes" help to prevent the
leakage of decrypted information. In order to be free of intellectual property problems
and export restrictions, SFS avoids patented algorithms and was developed outside
the United States. Gutmann does not release the source code because companies
developing other DOS-based cryptographic file systems could copy it5 .
Since SFS operates entirely on a single machine, the user must only trust the
local operating system and hardware. No concept of a "superuser" exists in the early
versions of MS-DOS. SFS protects against disclosure of data to unauthorized persons
who may gain physical access after files are encrypted. From the documentation,
it is unclear whether SFS protects sensitive metadata or provides security against
unauthorized modification. The protection granularity consists of an entire logical
partition of data.
The most interesting feature of SFS is the emergency access mechanism. To safe-
guard against data loss, this mechanism can recover lost passwords. The emergency
access mechanism employs Shamir's secret sharing scheme in which trusted escrow
agents receive n key fragments[37]. Any m-sized subset of the n agents can recover
the key. However, no smaller subset can feasibly recover the key. Unlike the big-
brother-ish escrow mechanisms of the Clipper Chip, SFS does not give any agent the
immediate ability to easily recover a key. Because m of the n pieces are needed to
4The Secure FileSystem by Gutmann and the Secure File System by Mazieres are completely
unrelated.
'Gutmann also blames any design problems on DOS.
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harvest the master key, m users must collude to surreptitiously recover a key.
SFS uses the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode of the Message Digest Cipher with
the Secure Hash Standard (MDC/SHS) encryption algorithm, designed by Gutmann
himself. The password generates an intermediate key by iterating a one-way hash
function over the password several hundred times. This intermediate key can decrypt
the master key which in turn decrypts/encrypts the data on the disk. Bruce Schneier
comments that using a hash function for encryption is dangerous since the hash
function designers did not intend for such use[36].
read E:\foo.c
User Programs MS-DOS -0 SFS Device Driver
Encryption/Decryption Engine
Local Disk T
Figure 1-7: SFS interfaces to MS-DOS as a device driver with raw access to the
physical disk. The thick dotted line represents confidential storage.
The SFS documentation boasts of moderate performance and excellent memory
usage. On an average 486 desktop system, SFS requires as little as 7.5KB of RAM.
Unlike CFS and TCFS (the next case study), SFS uses direct access to IDE and SCSI
hard drives for better performance. Figure 1-7 depicts the model of operation. This
probably hurt portability as SFS exists only for MS-DOS. However, Gutmann notes
that the SFS design does not limit itself to any particular operating system.
SFS offers two timeout mechanisms to deter compromises. Passwords have finite
lifetimes. When a password expires, SFS requires a new password to protect the
master key. However, this does not protect against direct attacks to the master
key encrypted with the old password. Changing a password just reduces the risk of
compromising the currently encrypted master key. A second timeout can unmount the
file system after a period of inactivity. Should a user absentmindedly walk away from
the console, the file system will automatically unmount itself to prevent unauthorized
access from the console.
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In unimplemented design ideas, Gutmann explains an anti-duress measure such
that adversaries cannot prove you know the key, and you can provide a reasonable
proof that you do not know the key[14]. Gutmann's scheme is a form of secret
sharing. Assuming you are dealing with a reasonable adversary, you can prevent the
disclosure of your key while staying alive. More recent literature describes theoretical
techniques for deniable encryption where a user can later disclose a fake key to reveal
an alternative plaintext[6].
On the downside, SFS is not easily portable. With the advent of Windows95, some
of the features of SFS require extra effort. Because MS-DOS is dreadfully simple,
SFS does not need to worry about many of the security problems found in the UNIX
operating system (e.g., multiple users or root access). Currently all development on
SFS has ceased. Gutmann has instead pursued the development a cryptographic
library called CryptLib. At least one commercial cryptographic storage file system
uses this library[42]. Consult the SFS documentation for further information on its
use and implementation[13].
1.4.3 Transparent Cryptographic File System
The Transparent Cryptographic File System (TCFS) seeks to improve upon the se-
curity model set by CFS[7]. Several students and faculty developed TCFS at the
Universit6 di Salerno in Italy during 1997. The early development was lead by G.
Cattaneo, G. Persiano, A. Del Sorbo, A. Cozzolino, E. Mauriello, and R. Pisapia.
New releases of TCFS appear on a regular basis. TCFS aims to offer the feel of
the Network File System (NFS) @ without the feeling of insecurity'. TCFS works
fundamentally the same as CFS in figure 1-4, except that TCFS is an in-kernel im-
plementation.
One of the principle tenets of TCFS is not to trust the server except to store
files. When a client machine attempts to access an encrypted file, the encrypted file
blocks are sent over the network. Upon arrival, the blocks are decrypted on the client
'NFS is a trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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machine. TCFS extends the UNIX file attributes to include an encryption bit. When
this bit is set, TCFS protects the file with encryption.
As is with CFS, the metadata are not encrypted. Although some confidentiality
may be lost to file sizes and file names, existing utilities such as the f sck disk recovery
program will continue to operate normally. The documentation does not explain
whether mechanisms exist to protect against unauthorized modification. Each user's
standard login password decrypts a key ring to access files. Therefore, all files with the
encryption bit set are encrypted by the owner's key. No built-in data loss protection
exists. TCFS currently supports compile-time options for ciphers including DES,
IDEA, and RC5. Keys are stored in a global key file which can be accessed by a
user's password.
A recently released version of TCFS implements a group secret sharing protocol.
A file can be opened only when a certain threshold number of group members log in
simultaneously. All group members must log into the same workstation. This is not
similar to the concept of group sharing in the UNIX file system.
TCFS has a strong following, but is somewhat less robust and well documented
compared to CFS. For instance, a likely buffer overflow in an old key generation pro-
gram could potentially expose root access. The program uses the getpass system call
and is Set-User-ID (SUID) root. An SUID root program will run with root permis-
sions, regardless of what user executed the program. Because TCFS requires changes
to the login binary, it does not interoperate well with other authentication systems
such as Kerberos or S/Key one-time passwords. On the other hand, TCFS is easily
available because Italy currently has no export restrictions on cryptography. TCFS
has regular releases and will likely become more robust as development continues.
1.4.4 SecureDrive
SecureDrive cryptographically protects entire partitions and disks in MS-DOS[39].
Edgar Swank and Mike Ingle worked on SecureDrive as a freeware project from 1993
until 1996. The model of SecureDrive matches that of SFS in figure 1-7. Unfortu-
nately, the available design documentation for SecureDrive consists of a lot of source
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code and an installation guide. SecureDrive hopes to encourage the use of encryp-
tion by making encryption easy to use. SecureDrive works on a limited basis in
Windows95.
One interesting feature of SecureDrive is the key file. One can create a file of
random bits in lieu of a password. This greatly increases the entropy to better thwart
brute force attacks. The key file can be generated by any program. For instance, PGP
2.6.2 offers an undocumented feature to create cryptographically strong random bits.
Swank explains two desirable features of a key file. First, the key file better represents
the notion of a physical key. You can carry the key file on a disk. This also means that
if you lose the disk, you lose your files. Or if someone finds your key file, that person
could decrypt your files. Second, a key file allows anti-duress measures, popularly
known as the anti "rubber hose" technique. A court order may require you to reveal
your password. However, by erasing your key file, you yourself can no longer decrypt
the files.
As with SFS, this file system enjoys the simplicity of MS-DOS. The user must trust
the local operating system and hardware. SecureDrive protects against disclosure.
It is unclear whether SecureDrive protects against unauthorized modification. The
issue of denial of service does not apply since SecureDrive does not consider network
usage. For data loss protection, SecureDrive suggests an out-of-band mechanism
for emergency key recovery. If you use a key file, you can use any available escrow
program to split your key amongst trusted third parties. This is completely left to the
discretion of the user. For secure tape backups, SecureDrive has no native methods.
But you can use a raw disk writing program to copy ranges of cylinders to a file, then
backup the file.
The granularity of protection is the volume or disk partition. That is, an entire
partition will share the same password and cryptographic key. Everything on the
disk partition except the boot sector is encrypted. The documentation suggests cre-
ating multiple partitions if several users plan to use the same computer. However,
SecureDrive is not designed to handle secure file sharing.
SecureDrive uses the IDEA cipher in CFB mode. The MD5 hash function converts
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the user's password into a 128-bit IDEA key. If a key file is used, the key file is
XORed with the key derived from the optional password. The disk serial number,
track numbers, and sector numbers are used as part of the IV to make encryption of
each sector unique.
SecureDrive requires minimal memory - the Terminate and Stay Resident (TSR)
program consumes only 2.7KB of RAM. Since encryption takes place at the sector
level, the encryption routines are completely transparent to the user. Changing pass-
words or key files can move slowly. An entire drive must be decrypted with the old
key while encrypting with the new key. This may be more secure than storing a
password-protected key file on the disk itself, but the process is slow. SecureDrive
comes with source code.
1.4.5 SecureDevice
This freeware device driver for MS-DOS is a direct descendent of SecureDrive. Hence,
its model is the same as in figure 1-7. SecureDevice uses the IDEA cipher to protect
volumes of data[20]. Max Loewenthal and Arthur Helwig developed SecureDevice in
the Netherlands in 1994. SecureDevice uses a single file as a virtual disk volume. This
allows much more flexibility, but suffers performance drawbacks because of its location
above another file system. SecureDevice uses the same trust model as SecureDrive
and SFS.
Very little documentation explains the internals of SecureDevice. The unit of
granularity is the virtual disk volume. In other words, one key protects everything.
According to the source code, the CFB mode of IDEA protects the virtual disk
volume. Encryption takes place on a per-sector basis. Each sector on a volume is
encrypted separately with a different IV. To generate the IDEA key, SecureDevice
takes the MD5 hash of the user's password. A different master IV is used for each
volume created. SecureDevice then mixes the master IV with the 32-bit sector number
to produce a unique IV for each sector. As with SecureDrive, changing a key suffers
performance drawbacks. Since the password is directly used for encryption, an entire
volume must go through a lengthy decryption and encryption routine.
31
Because SecureDevice stores the encrypted disk volume as a single file, backups are
extremely simple. Just copy the file to a remote device such as a tape drive. However,
fragmentation of a large volume can lead to instability. If a file is fragmented into
more than 50 pieces on the disk, DOS will become unstable. A disk defragmentation
program is necessary to correct this problem.
1.4.6 CryptDisk
CryptDisk ensures the confidentiality of entire partitions on the Macintosh[29]. This
is a shareware product written in 1995 by Will Price, then a graduate student at the
University of Southern California. CryptDisk has since become a commercial product
called PGPdisk[28].
As in SecureDevice, a special container file acts as a virtual disk. To mount an
encrypted partition, one simply drags the icon of the container file to the icon of
the CryptDisk application. One can then access individual files of the encrypted
partition - as if they were regular files. As with SFS, CryptDisk will unmount all
volumes after an inactivity timeout. An emergency recovery option exists to decrypt
an entire volume should it ever have problems mounting. The drag-and-drop nature
of the Macintosh makes the file system almost completely transparent to the user.
The trusted computing base is the same as the DOS-based cryptographic file
systems previously discussed. Since the Macintosh operating system does not have
the concepts of multiple users or a root account, CryptDisk must only trust the local
operating system and hardware. The model is virtually the same as in figure 1-7.
CryptDisk protects files using the IDEA encryption algorithm in CFB mode with
an IV that varies every 512 bytes. CryptDisk uses a master key derived from a
function of a password. The password may be up to 128 characters in length, and is
hashed an arbitrary number of times and salted with random data to insure a good
key. Session keys protect individual files. A file's session key derives from the master
key and a publicly known, random salt value. The salt varies for each file. Because
CryptDisk uses a master key to obtain file keys, it is easy to change the password.
Price warns that buffers in memory could be swapped to disk by virtual memory.
32
In other words, an IDEA key may be inadvertently written to disk, allowing anyone
at the console to grab the key. Bruce Schneier points out that Norton Diskreet
suffered from this problem as well[36]. Peter Gutmann discusses such swap file issues
in archives of the sfs-crypt mailing list[13].
1.5 Common Features
This section examines the common features in cryptographic storage file systems.
Table 1.1 summarizes differences among the case studies. In this section, "the file
systems" refers to all of the case studies.
File System Granularity of Protection Operating System Unique Feature
CFS Directory SunOS, Linux Networkable
SFS Partition MS-DOS Emergency Recovery
TCFS User Account Linux Threshold Sharing
SecureDrive Partition MS-DOS Key Files
SecureDevice Partition MS-DOS Easy Backup
CryptDisk Partition MacOS Drag-and-Drop
Table 1.1: A comparison of cryptographic storage file systems.
1.5.1 Key Management & Sharing
Most of the file systems leave key management up to the user. That is, sharing
involves disclosing your personal password. If a cryptographic file system promotes
sharing, it should have a transparent mechanism to obtain keys when necessary,
rather than forcing the user to juggle many passwords. Furthermore, to integrate a
cryptographic file system with existing authentication systems such as Kerberos or
SecurelD, a design must not mandate a specific method for user authentication.
1.5.2 Portability
Based on the amount of online discussion, CFS is by far the most widely used cryp-
tographic file system. One of the driving forces behind CFS is portability. Because
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CFS uses an NFS loopback server rather than the VFS/Vnode interface of the kernel,
CFS quickly ports to other UNIX systems. However, such portability comes at the
cost of context switching between kernel and user mode. When CFS is used over a
network, files must travel through several NFS servers.
1.5.3 Transparency
General users will not welcome a cryptographic file system unless the internal cryp-
tographic routines are transparent. Fortunately, most of the file systems have a good
level of transparency. Changes in access semantics and performance are not usually
noticeable for small files. Traditional file system utilities such as fsck would other-
wise require significant modification. By making the cryptography transparent, users
can perform their tasks unhindered, and file system utilities can operate without
modification.
1.5.4 Encryption Costs
Since encryption can add significant delays for file I/O, cryptographic file systems try
to reduce the amount of encryption and decryption. For instance, CFS uses a novel
method of encryption in the OFB+ECB mode[4]. This mode allows pre-computation
of part of the key stream. When a block requires encryption, the file system must
simply XOR a pre-computed key stream and encrypt a block.
1.5.5 Fine-grained Access Control
Cryptographic file systems must choose an appropriate level of protection granularity.
By grouping files together protected by one key, significantly fewer cycles are spent
creating key streams. However, the grouping also increases potential damage from a
lost or stolen key. The examined file systems have granularity ranging from directories
to partitions.
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1.5.6 Key Changes & Revocation
Changing a key or revoking group membership should not consume an excessive
amount of CPU time. Users demand that normal operations run in a reasonable
amount of time. For instance, TCFS uses a login password to decrypt a key ring. If
the login password changes, one need only re-encrypt the key ring. The files protected
by the keys in the key ring do not necessarily require re-encryption. By using indirec-
tion, it is possible to minimize the cascading effects of a key change or membership
revocation. However, this may result in a penalty to security. An adversary could
mount an attack on the system by using old key rings. Therefore, it is not appropriate
to use simple key indirection if an adversary steals a key ring.
1.5.7 Intrusion Tolerance
Cryptographic file systems must tolerate some level of intrusion. For instance, a user
should not be able to use his or her password to decrypt a global password file for every
user. File systems should also tolerate collusion amongst system administrators[11].
Often secret sharing schemes can drive the probability of compromise to near zero.
1.5.8 Reliability
Escrow is a touchy issue. But some form of key recovery is necessary since users often
forget passwords. This may not be important for temporal data such as email, but
it is important for long-term storage. A lost key implies lost data. Escrow or highly
reliable backups forgo some security for the persistence of data.
1.5.9 Trust in System Administrators
One feature of a cryptographic file system is that the user needs not trust the system
administrator to keep files confidential. However, the system administrator should
perform his or her job of maintaining hardware and performing backups. In all of the
case studies, the file systems trust the system administrator to maintain file integrity
and keep files available.
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1.5.10 Integrity
Most cryptographic file systems provide confidentiality, but not integrity[17]. That
is, an adversary could undetectably change bits on the disk. The legitimate user
might only notice a corrupted block of plaintext. The file systems do not detect
unauthorized modification. A user might notice modifications when garbled files
appear. In networked file systems, some mechanism to detect tampering is necessary.
MACs or digital signatures may help, but re-signing files continuously will have serious
performance drawbacks.
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Chapter 2
Design Requirements
Here we list the necessary properties and features of our cryptographic storage file
system. First, we state the general criteria of Cepheus. Next, we classify failures as
tolerable or intolerable. Finally, a trust model is developed and justified. In the next
chapter, we propose a design to meet the criteria.
2.1 Design Criteria
Cepheus protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of storage. The fol-
lowing criteria guided the design of Cepheus:
* Ensure the confidentiality of file data and directory contents
* Maintain integrity of file data, directory contents, and metadata
e Provide for availability of file data, directory contents, and metadata
" Facilitate simple group sharing with similar semantics to the UNIX file system
" Allow efficient random access to file data, directory contents, and metadata
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Cepheus must protect file data and directory contents from unauthorized access. This
includes information such as file names and data blocks, but not metadata such as
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modification times, data block pointers, and other stat information found in the in-
ode. Only users explicitly granted access should be able to read the plaintext contents.
For instance, a system administrator does not implicitly have access to plaintext. This
separates the privilege of storage management from that of confidentiality[32].
We do not protect confidentiality of metadata in order to enable better crash
recovery. For instance, if data block pointers were encrypted, the file server could
not piece together a partially written file. While this may allow for limited traffic
analysis, we consider the ability to recover from failures more important.
2.1.2 Integrity
Cepheus must detect damage to integrity of file data, directory contents, and meta-
data. However, this does not require prevention against unauthorized alteration. We
explain prevention in the next paragraph. For integrity we merely stipulate unautho-
rized alterations be detectable. This allows users to know with certainty that a file is
what it claims to be. An adversary cannot add to file contents or change metadata
without being detected.
2.1.3 Availability
We explain the difference between integrity and availability in subsection 2.3.4. Be-
cause integrity can only detect unauthorized alterations, we further require prevention
of unauthorized alterations. For instance, if an unauthorized user deleted all the files,
the requirements of subsection 2.1.2 still hold. The deletions are detectable. File
data, directory contents, and metadata must be readily available and not subject to
simple denial of service attacks.
2.1.4 Secure Group Sharing
Cepheus must allow for group sharing with similar semantics to those of the UNIX
file system. However, the permissions must be cryptographically enforced. As an
example, consider a file with group read access, but no write access. A group member
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should not be able to create authentic writes even though the group member can
decrypt and read file contents. Only a group owner should have the ability to add
new members to the group.
2.1.5 Efficient Random Access
Cepheus file reads and writes must perform similarly to that of a traditional file
system. For instance, reading the last or first byte of a file should take approximately
the same time. Moreover, encryption should be used conservatively by minimizing
online cryptographic operations. Operating on a small file should execute quickly.
Operating on a large file should perform efficiently.
2.2 Failure Conditions
All systems are subject to uncontrollable failures. However, tolerable failures should
be recoverable. Below we classify failures as tolerable or intolerable. For tolerable
events, we discuss necessary properties of recovery.
2.2.1 Intolerable Failures
We expect all hardware to operate correctly or to recover on its own. Cepheus does
not attempt to recover from catastrophic failures beneath the block I/O level. For
instance, the underlying media (i.e., the hard drive) should ensure reliable storage of
information. Strategies such as the Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID)
can make the likelihood of unrecoverable failure extremely low.
2.2.2 Tolerable Failures
Several events can cause a file system to enter an inconsistent state. In such tolerable
failures, Cepheus must recover to a consistent state. In a typical UNIX file system,
an unexpected power failure could leave a partially written file. This may cause the
inode table to be inconsistent with the freemap, for example. Also, writes to the
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cache may not have been fully flushed to disk, leading to lost file data. Kernel panics
and other software crashes are treated just like power failures since the end result
is the same. Cepheus must also recover from incomplete operations resulting from
client crashes, file server crashes, and group database server crashes. The next section
describes these modules in more depth.
Since Cepheus introduces the idea of cryptographic integrity built into a file sys-
tem, it must gracefully recover from integrity check failures. If a file contains unau-
thorized modifications, the file system should return an error and refuse to serve the
file. The user agent can recover damaged files through reconciliation with the user.
Similar constraints apply when a key is lost or decryption fails.
2.3 Cryptographic Storage Trust Model
This section defines and defends a trust model for Cepheus. We incrementally build
up our trust model, ensuring that Cepheus stays as secure as conventional file systems
and wherever possible more secure. Recall that Cepheus has five criteria for storage:
confidentiality, integrity, availability, group sharing, and random access. Random
access to file data is independent of the principals in our trust model. This issue
appears in the next chapter. We first define the principals in our model, then begin
with a trust model for confidentiality.
2.3.1 Trust Model Principals
Below are the principals in our trust model, as depicted by figure 2-1.
* A client machine is a multi-user workstation. A client daemon and one or more
user agents run on this machine.
" A client daemon communicates with user agents and file servers.
" A user agent acts on behalf of the user and retrieves file and group keys. It
responds to requests from the client daemon and communicates with the group
database server. Each user has a user agent.
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" A file server stores and retrieves files for client daemons. It also communicates
with the group database server.
* A group database server maintains group membership information, user public
keys, and group symmetric keys. It responds to requests from file servers and
user agents.
" A network connects client machines, file servers, and the group database server.
The network is publicly accessible.
* A group consists of a list of users which share a common privilege for file access.
Figure 2-1: Interactions among the trust model principals in Cepheus.
2.3.2 Confidentiality
Files remain confidential if and only if users with explicit permission can understand
the stored file data. For instance, a file server administrator should not implicitly be
able to decrypt the files; encrypted files are opaque to the server. Client-side encryp-
tion can easily provide for confidentiality. A simple trust model for the confidentiality
of file data and directory contents is as follows:
1. A file server maintains the reliable storage of files.
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2. A user agent is completely trusted by the user. It performs decryption and
encryption at the request of the client daemon. It trusts that client daemon
requests are authentic and that the client daemon will not disclose plaintext to
unauthorized parties.
3. A client machine will not snoop in the buffer cache or keys of the user agents.
It is either a single-user machine, or the users trust all persons who effectively
have root access.
4. A client daemon trusts that file system requests from the kernel are authentic.
It maintains a buffer cache of plaintext and ciphertext for each user, and asks
user agents to perform decryption and encryption.
5. The principals trust the network only for reliable packet delivery.
Clearly, this model is more secure than that of a conventional file system. Only
the user agent has access to plaintext. This is the model used by most conventional
cryptographic storage file systems.
2.3.3 Integrity
To provide for integrity, it must be possible to verify that no unauthorized person has
modified the file data, directory contents, or metadata. For instance, if the file server
or network were to flip a bit of the encrypted file, the user agent should detect the
alteration. Cryptographic hashes, message authentication codes, or digital signatures
can provide for integrity. In addition to the trust model for confidentiality, we require:
6. At the request of the client daemon, user agents create and verify an integrity
field that is not easily forged.
7. The file server and group database server will not collude with users to obtain
unauthorized privileges.
8. The client daemon will not request a user agent to create an integrity field for
bogus data.
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Since only the user agent can create a valid integrity field, the user agent can detect
unauthorized changes. Other users and the file server cannot feasibly construct an
authentic integrity field on their own. But a user with read access could collude
with the file server to gain authenticated write access. For this reason, our trust
model forbids such collusion. It is possible to omit this requirement with digital
signatures, but we have not discovered an efficient mechanism to do so. Note that
these requirements do not hurt or improve confidentiality. Moreover, we still maintain
a more secure system than a conventional file system.
2.3.4 Availability
In network link security, one works to secure a link between two end points. If an in-
tegrity check fails, the client can simply ask for a retransmission. But in cryptographic
storage, the client is both the starting and ending point. There is no opportunity for
retransmission if an encrypted file is lost. Consequently, cryptographic storage must
rely on prevention rather than detection to preserve integrity. This leads to our third
goal, availability.
Denial of service attacks are notoriously difficult to prevent. For instance, a
malicious user could consume all the resources of the file server by making bogus
requests. Such an attack reduces the availability of a service. The next paragraphs
explain what is necessary to achieve reasonable availability.
Cryptographic storage can separate the responsibility of storage management from
that of confidentiality[32]. Unfortunately, we cannot entirely separate storage man-
agement from availability. Consider two trust models of a server administrator: the
first model trusts the server administrator merely for reliable storage. The server
acts on requests to read and write files. A second model additionally trusts the server
administrator to verify authorization of user requests.
In both models, the client can maintain confidentiality and detect failures of in-
tegrity. But availability requires cooperation with the server. If the file server per-
forms no authorization, a benevolent server cannot distinguish authorized users from
unauthorized users. Hence, the server cannot prevent unauthorized reads and writes.
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If the server performs authorization, we can prevent unauthorized requests to modify
files and metadata. In the worst case (a malicious server), the trust models result
in the same availability; a malicious server can ignore authorization. But in the
expected case (a benevolent server), the second model can prevent unauthorized re-
quests. Consequently, unauthorized users cannot simply remove files. Moreover, we
can improve confidentiality. Unauthorized users must exert effort to break the au-
thorization mechanism before they can attack the confidentiality. In addition to the
trust model for confidentiality and integrity, we require:
9. The file server reliably stores files and verifies authenticity and authorization of
requests by consulting with the group database server. The file server believes
in the authenticity of user information from the group database server. There
is an integrity-protected link to the group database server.
10. The group database server responds correctly to authorization requests and
maintains authentication and authorization information of users.
If the encryption keys are not derivable from the authentication process, confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability remain independent of each other.
2.3.5 Group Sharing
With group sharing, a single key allows a group member to access files assigned to
the group. Unfortunately, giving away a group key also gives away the ability to add
new group members. However, the file server can prevent this unauthorized spread
of privileges. The file server verifies that a user belongs to a group by consulting with
the group database server. Our trust model additionally requires:
11. The file server is trusted not to obey requests for which the group database
server denies access. The file server believes in the authenticity of group mem-
bership information from the group database server.
12. The group database server keeps up-to-date membership lists and distributes
group keys.
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13. Only user agents with group write access can create authentic integrity fields.
14. Users are trusted to be responsible and not disclose private information through
covert channels.
We now have all the features of a conventional network file system, but we have
provided for each in a secure manner. We note that for strict confidentiality with
group sharing, we must include item 14 in the trust model. Otherwise group sharing
could affect confidentiality of files. A user could simply redistribute plaintext in an
out-of-band channel. Furthermore, a group member with read access could collude
with a file server to create valid integrity fields.
Our final trust model enables confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a net-
work file system with group sharing. We were not able to tighten the trust model
any further without losing confidentiality, integrity, or availability. With this model
in mind, we can now design Cepheus in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Cepheus Design
We first discuss fundamental concepts for group sharing and random access. Then
we describe the four modules of Cepheus: the user agent, the client daemon, the file
server daemon, and the group database server. Figure 3-1 shows how the modules
interact. We rationalize how the design of Cepheus complies with the requirements
given in chapter 2. Finally, we summarize design alternatives.
3.1 Group Sharing
Group sharing consists of two ideas: maintaining group membership lists and main-
taining group access rights. A group database server facilitates for the former while
the file server and file structures take care of latter. Section 3.3 explains the details
of the file structures. We discuss the group database server in section 3.7.
Much of the group sharing depends on the concept of a lock box. We use this term
in reference to a key encrypted with another key. The lock box metaphor corresponds
to the lock box used by real estate agents. A realtor can attach a small lock box to the
door of a house for sale. Within the box is the key to the house. Anyone who knows
the combination to the lock box can indirectly obtain the house key. In this way, the
lock box can exist out in the public, but only authorized persons can open the lock
box to reveal the protected key. Lock boxes are similar to master key systems[8].
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File System RPCs
Pti Secy~t
UAt FS
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Figure 3-1: The client daemon (CD) acts as an NFS loopback server on the client
workstation. The CD asks the appropriate user agent (UA) to encrypt, decrypt, sign,
or verify data. Each CD communicates with the appropriate file server (FS). The FS
checks with the group database server (GDS) for authentication and authorization of
a user agent. The thick dotted line represents confidential storage.
3.2 Random Access
In a traditional file system, the running time of a read or write request is mostly
independent of the location of the data in the file. For instance, reading the last
block of a 40MB file should take about as long as reading the first block of a 40MB
file. Below we explain how Cepheus preserves this independence.
Cepheus encrypts each file data block separately. Figure 3-2 depicts the encryption
of one file data block. Because a block cipher typically has an input size of 8 bytes,
we must split the 8KB file data block into 1024 smaller blocks, P 1...P1024 . We use
RC5 with the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode to encrypt these smaller blocks[313.
The CBC mode allows one to chain several encryptions together. Before encrypting
a plaintext block, the mode first XORs the previous ciphertext with the current
plaintext. When using an initialization vector (IV), this mixing action lets a single
key securely encrypt several chained blocks. Since all blocks within a file use the
same key, we use IVs to make sure similar plaintext blocks in a file do not encrypt to
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similar ciphertext blocks. Each 8KB block in Cepheus has its own 8-byte IV, stored
in the data pointer as shown in figure 3-3.
P1 Pn
IV Cn-i
key Block Cipher key Block Cipher key Block Cipher
Co Ci Cn
Figure 3-2: In Cepheus, file data is encrypted in CBC mode on a per block basis.
Block ciphers typically have two 8-byte inputs.
Reading file data involves two operations: decrypting data blocks and verifying
an authenticity/integrity check field (AICF). After Cepheus obtains the encrypted
block, IV, and file key, the block can be decrypted. With the plaintext block and
AICF, Cepheus can verify the integrity of the file data.
Similarly, writing file data involves encrypting data blocks and creating an AICF.
However, the exact writing procedure, which we explain in subsection 3.3.2, is more
involved. Whenever Cepheus writes a block, the IV changes as well. This prevents
an adversary from analyzing the history of a file (e.g., what part of the file changed).
We note that Blaze's CFS uses IVs for a different reason. CFS uses an IV to prevent
similar blocks from appearing in different files because several files within a directory
share the same key.
Contents 4-Byte 8-Byte 20-Byte
of a Data Disk Initialization Vector Cryptographic Hash
Pointer Address
Figure 3-3: The data pointer contains an IV and hash node in addition to the pointer
to the data block.
49
3.2.1 Delayed Re-encryption
When a group member departs from a group, the corresponding group key must
also change. Moreover, the contents of lock boxes protected by that group key must
change. In other words, all files associated with the group require re-encryption. Re-
encrypting thousands of files at once would introduce significant delay. To avoid this
delay, we relax the requirements of re-encryption due to group membership changes.
Re-encryption results from two basic causes: group reorganization and key com-
promises. For each cause, we recognize a satisfactory way to perform re-encryption[15].
In casual group reorganization, we can simply mark a file to be re-encrypted, putting
off the re-encryption as long as possible. Such delayed re-encryption permits a former
group member to read old cached data, but not new updates. AFS uses a similar
model because little can be done to disallow the client from reading its own cache.
On the other hand, a key compromise requires more immediate attention. Expedited
re-encryption would quickly re-encrypt files in the case of serious emergencies. Since
we expect most causes to have a benign nature (group reorganization), Cepheus uses
delayed re-encryption by default.
To invoke delayed re-encryption, the owner first marks the cryptographic dirty bit
of the file and sets up a new file key in a lock box. Then any group member with
write access can later re-encrypt the file and clear the dirty bit. The file does not
need re-encryption until someone makes a change to the file. Note that the entire
file must be re-encrypted at once. We do not allow one portion of the file to remain
encrypted in an old key. We can get away with this lazy behavior because of the
same reason AFS does not prevent a client from reading its cache. We perceive one
problematic issue with transparency. For example, delayed re-encryption may cause
unexpected delay when a re-keyed file is opened in append mode. Cepheus would
have to re-encrypt the whole file, not just the appended data.
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3.2.2 Buffer Cache: Delayed Encryption
Almost all file systems use a buffer cache of recently read blocks. The cache allows
fast access to blocks we expect to read again soon. With the addition of cryptography,
a cache becomes even more useful. Cepheus uses a plaintext and ciphertext buffer
cache on the client-side to absorb file writes and redundant encryption. A delayed
write policy waits for a set period of time before writing the dirty blocks to the
file server[41]. Since a newly-written block is often overwritten or deleted within a
few minutes of its creation, the delayed write policy can absorb many unnecessary
writes[27]. In a similar manner, our buffer cache delays encryption of newly-written
blocks. Hence, a delayed encryption policy can significantly reduce the amount of
encryption for file writes. On the other hand, delayed writes can make recoverability
more complex. If a client machine crashes before flushing buffers to disk, files may
become inconsistent.
3.3 File System Structures
Cepheus augments the metadata found in an inode. We add a few twists to the
traditional UNIX file system for cryptographic storage. We did not intend to squeeze
every cycle using techniques from the Berkeley Fast File System or XFS[23, 40].
However, no part of the design prohibits the use of advanced structures found in such
file systems. Much of the structure is based on the X-File System[12].
All data on the disk is written in 8KB blocks. For instance, inodes are grouped
together to fill a block. Ideally, structures should be a power of two to pack the blocks
tightly. We use a large block size to reduce the overhead of encryption and to absorb
several writes into one re-encryption operation.
3.3.1 Inodes
In addition to the standard fields, our inode contains the following attributes:
. owner lock box (file key locked for owner's use only)
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* group lock box (file key locked for group's use only)
* owner old lock box (old file key locked for owner's use only)
" group old lock box (old file key locked for group's use only)
e authenticity/integrity check field
" group key ID
" file key ID
* old file key ID
Attributes
Key Lock Boxes 256 Data
Direct Data Pointer Pointers
Singly Indirect Data Pointer
AICF Poitters
256 Data
Pointers
ee
256
Data
Pointers
Figure 3-4: Using one direct, one singly indirect, and one doubly indirect data pointer,
a single inode in Cepheus can address up to 514MB of data.
The lock boxes contain encrypted file keys. Only authorized users can obtain
the key to open the lock boxes. We keep the previous version of the lock boxes for
purposes of delayed re-encryption. A file owner updates the current lock boxes to
re-key a file. If the old and current lock boxes differ, a user agent realizes the file
requires re-encryption. Once the file is re-encrypted with the new key, the old lock
box is set to the contents of the current lock box.
3.3.2 Authenticity/Integrity Check Field
Cepheus uses an authenticity/integrity check field (AICF) to verify the integrity of file
data and metadata[17]. The slanted tree structure of the AICF parallels exactly the
structure of the direct, singly indirect, and doubly indirect data pointers in figure 1-
2. This leads to a natural structure that flows conveniently with existing file system
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operations. For instance, the IV tends to be read immediately before reading its
related data block. This significantly reduces the number of disk reads at the cost of
a large branching factor.
Each data pointer contains a 20-byte hash of its data. Figure 3-5 denotes this
20-byte value with a circled H. At the top of the tree, the AICF is the keyed hash of
its children.
Inode AF
Direct Data
Pointer
KB Data KB Singly Indirect 8KB Doubly Indirect
Block Data Pointer Block Data Pointer Block
256 Pointers 256 Pointers
( 8 ata . _ 8KB Data 8KB Singly Indirec,,, 8KB Singly IndirectjBlock DtPointer Block Data Pointer Blc
[256 Pointers 
256 Pointers
8 D , 8KB Data 8KB Data , , 8KB Data
Block Block Block Block
Figure 3-5: The authenticity/integrity check field (AICF) for the file data consists of
a cryptographic hash tree. Contents of the dashed box appear in the inode.
We use the HMAC construction of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk as our keyed
cryptographic hash[2]. The HMAC function is defined as
HMACk(x) = F(k, pad,, F(k, pad2, X))
where the commas represent concatenation, k is the key, padi and pad2 are sequences
of a known constant, F is cryptographic hash, and x is the data being authenticated.
In Cepheus, we use SHA1 as F and the file key as k.
Only someone with the file key can verify or create the AICF. If the file server
colludes with an outsider (breaking our trust model), our design does not guarantee
integrity. We would like to loosen this trust requirement, but we have not been able
to avoid public-key techniques for such a model.
Reading an integrity-protected block works as follows. The client daemon obtains
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the encrypted block in question and the inode containing the AICF. The client daemon
then requests all the data pointer blocks which contain siblings to the nodes on the
hash path from the block in question to the AICF. Next, the client daemon passes
this information to the user agent for verification. The user agent verifies the hashes
along the path from the block to the AICF. If the AICF is correct, the user agent
returns the plaintext to the client daemon.
By caching these answers, we can avoid much recomputation for subsequent
reads[18]. The client daemon caches data pointers in 8KB blocks. Moreover, the
user agent will not recompute a hash for already verified paths. Hence, the cost of
reading a block without interleaved writes is 0(1) amortized over a sequential read
of the entire file of n blocks. We will read each data pointer once and compute each
hash node exactly once.
Writing an integrity-protected block works in a similar manner. After writing a
block to the buffer cache, the user agent schedules the block for encryption and a new
AICF. The client daemon will eventually propagate updated data pointer blocks and
the AICF to the file server. In the worst case, a write will take O(logn) time to re-
compute a path from the block in question to the AICF. However, the large branching
factor (256) makes the depth of the tree at most three levels. This is effectively a
constant factor.
3.3.3 Crash Recovery
Since our file server uses its own file structures, we must create our own version of
f sck. As the structures are very similar to conventional file systems, it should not be
extremely difficult to make modifications to f sck. Because we keep old lock boxes in
the inode, we can attempt recovery of partially re-encrypted files.
If the plaintext cache is not flushed to disk because of a crash, the changes will be
lost, but the file system will remain consistent. We could try other caching policies
for better reliability at the cost of performance. We expect some problems related to
integrity when the file server attempts to salvage a damaged partition. Since parts of
the disk may be lost, the AICFs will report spurious errors.
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3.4 Client Daemon
The client daemon acts as a dummy process to intercept local file system calls (see
figure 3-6). The client daemon acts on requests from the kernel, makes requests of
the user agent, and communicates with the file server. By using an NFS loopback
server, we can avoid writing any in-kernel code. The loopback server pretends to be
an NFS server, acting on file requests to a virtual directory.
UA CD FS
time
return encrypted
please decrypt and
check integrity
return plaintext
block
Figure 3-6: An example of reading a block: after the client daemon intercepts a
read request from the NFS loopback server, it obtains a block through the following
method. Had the block already existed in the cache, the client daemon would skip
these steps and simply return the cached data.
3.4.1 Buffer Cache
An important decision involved placement of the plaintext and ciphertext cache in
the client daemon. However, we made several arguments to keep the cache in the
user agent. In the end, all of the arguments to keep the cache in the user agent were
either impractical or obviated by the interface between the client daemon and user
agent.
We decided to place the cache in the client daemon for three reasons. First, the
client daemon will unavoidably see the flow of plaintext through the NFS loopback
server. Hence, the user must trust the client daemon anyway. Because only one pro-
cess on a machine can intercept NFS requests, one client daemon must intercept the
file requests for all the users. Second, keeping the cache in the client daemon reduces
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context switching and unnecessary memory copies. All decryptions and encryptions
can happen in-place. The user agent can easily encrypt and decrypt information us-
ing shared memory by request of the client daemon. Third, we reduce the number of
client RPC handles. Each client of the file server must obtain a client RPC handle
by contacting the file server. The handle acts as a name to make requests of the file
server. If each user agent were to contact the file server, the user agents would each
need a client RPC handle. By making all file server requests flow through the client
daemon, we reduce the number of client RPC handles. Moreover, the client daemon
is a more natural place to keep track of client RPC handles.
While the client daemon controls the cache, the user agent can easily specify a
storage location for the cache. For instance, the agent could ask the client daemon
to store the cache in a locally encrypted file, a PCMCIA disk, or in memory.
We could have used other policies for flushing dirty blocks to disk. For instance,
the write-on-close policy waits to write buffers until the file closes. We avoid this
policy because with large files, the encryption can be costly if we wait for the file to
close. The delayed encryption allows us to flush all writes related to a particular file
after a set period of time.
3.4.2 File Server Communication
A second decision involved who should talk to the file server. We decided to let the
client daemon function as a NFS loopback server - listening for file requests. Because
the client daemon now talks to several different processes, both local and remote, the
implementation involves multitasking and shared memory. We explain these details
in section 4.2.
3.5 User Agent
The user agent responds to requests from the client daemon and communicates with
the group database server. The user entrusts the user agent with his or her long-term
private key. Whenever the agent needs to retrieve a file key or group key, it contacts
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the group database server and opens the appropriate lockboxes with the user's private
key.
3.6 File Server
The file server responds to Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) from the client daemon.
The server also has a raw interface to a disk and implements 13 system calls:
" getattr: get file attributes
" setattr: set files attributes
" lookup: look up file name
" read: read from file
" write: write to file
e lock: lock or re-lock a file for a bounded duration
" unlock: unlock a file
" read-dp-block: read an indirect data pointer block
* write-dp-block: write an indirect data pointer block
* statf s: get file system attributes
" create: create file
" link: create link to file
* unlink: decrement a file's reference count
Many of the above RPCs come from the NFS protocol. However, noticeably
absent are the readlink, remove, rename, symlink, mkdir, rmdir, and readdir
RPCs. Because the file server has no access to plaintext directories, the client must
take care of all operations to directory entries. For this reason, we added a locking
mechanism to achieve atomicity of client daemon RPCs which each generate several
file server RPCs.
Note, we must also authenticate and authorize individual RPCs. If an adversary
could forge authentic file server RPCs, we could not ensure availability of data. Hence,
the RPCs require cryptographic authentication in addition to the confidentiality and
integrity provided by Cepheus.
57
To check authorization, the file server obtains information from the group database
server over an integrity-protected link. The group database server and file server can
exchange long-term public keys through an out-of-band mechanisms. Each could then
use the public keys to negotiate session keys.
The authentication of read requests is optional. Since file data is encrypted, one
should not have to rely on access control, but we do not want to tempt fate. We set
as default authentication of read requests, but the file server administrator can toggle
this option to tune performance.
The file server must also make requests to the group database service. To reduce
the online communication cost with the group database server, the file server peri-
odically requests a complete dump of the authorization database. This allows for
quick membership verification. Moreover, the file server can send the locked group
keys when a user agent requests a file. In this way, the user agent need not always
communicate with the group database service to obtain a group key.
3.7 Group Database Server
The group database server maintains the master list of group membership and user
public keys. It also facilitates the distribution of shared symmetric group keys. We
assume there exists a mechanism to initially add authenticated public keys of system
administrators to the group database server. Further operations use the following
RPCs:
" Add User: If authorized, given a name and public key PK, return a new UID
and store PK. If name already used, error.
" Delete User: If authorized, mark UID and PKUID as disabled. Remove UID
from all group lists. Error if UID is currently a group owner.
" List users: If authorized, list all names of users.
* User 2 UID: If authorized, given a user's name, return the UID.
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* UID 2 User: If authorized, given a UID, return user's name.
" Get User PK: If authorized, given a UID, return the PK-UID.
" Set User PK: If authorized, given a UID and PKUID, store the PK.
" Get User Permissions: If authorized, find a bitmask representing the group
database permissions of a user.
" Set User Permissions: If authorized, set the group database permissions of a
user according to a bitmask.
" Add Group: If authorized, given a new group name and group key encrypted
with creator's PK, return a group ID. Group is owned by the creator.
" Delete Group: If authorized, given a GID, delete all info about the group.
" List Groups: If authorized, list GIDs
" Group Name 2 GKID: If authorized, given a group name, return its group key
ID. If does not exist, error.
" GKID 2 Group Name: If authorized, given a group key ID, return its name. If
does not exist, error.
" Get Group Key: If requester is in the membership, return G_PK_UID. The user
can then decrypt with his secret key SK. [authorization depends on UID and
GID of requester]
" Add Group Member: If authorized, given a GID, UID, and group key encrypted
in UID's PK, add UID to the membership (G_PK_UID).
" Delete Group Member: If authorized, given a GID and a UID, remove UID
from the membership and delete G_PK_UID. [authorization depends on UID
and GID of requester]
" List Group Members: If authorized, given a GID, return the UIDs of member-
ship. [authorization depends on UID and GID of requester]
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* Change Group Key: Complex. Every member needs the new key. If autho-
rized, given a new key encrypted with owner's PK, and the same key encrypted
with each member's key, flush the old membership and replace. [authorization
depends on UID and GID of requester]
* Change Group Owner: Bestow another user with ownership of a group.
" Get Member's Groups: If authorized, return a list of all the groups which
contain the member.
" User in Group: Returns whether a user is a member of a group.
The server operates in a manner such that it never sees a symmetric group key
in the clear. When a user agent encounters a file protected with a group key, it
contacts the group database server for a lock box containing the group key. The
group key leads to another key which can decrypt the file. Since only the file owners
and group members can open the lock boxes, files data and directory contents remain
confidential.
This authentication system uses public key cryptography, but it could could have
been implemented using secret key cryptography. Secret key cryptography may exe-
cute faster, but public key cryptography is more straightforward to conceptualize and
design.
3.8 Design Alternatives
This section discusses alternatives to our design and reasons for their non-inclusion.
3.8.1 Ciphers
We selected RC5 because it can quickly generate key schedules, but no part of the
design prohibits the use of another cipher (e.g., DES or the coming AES). We could
have also used VRA or SEAL in a pseudo-random function mode instead of a block
cipher. That is, the cipher is given a block number, a key, and a length. The cipher
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then returns the appropriate pseudo-random mask for that extent. The mask is
simply XORed with the plaintext. A drawback here is that re-encryption with the
same key is subject to a chosen plaintext attack. If an adversary were to chose a
plaintext, obtain the encryption, then see the encryption of a changed block, the
adversary could simply XOR the old plaintext with the old encryption to obtain the
key. The key would reveal the new plaintext.
3.8.2 Initialization Vector
We considered using one IV per file rather than one IV per block. This led to a few
options. We could use one file IV as a seed to generate a pseudo-random IV for each
block of that file as shown in figure 3-7. This would conserve space and allow the
data blocks to be well-aligned on 8KB boundaries. However, changing any IV would
require changing all IVs.
inode
8192 Data Bytes
IV 
8192 Data Bytes
Figure 3-7: A pseudo-random function seeded with a block number and one shared
IV could generate new IVs.
3.8.3 Authenticity/Integrity Check Field
We considered another mode for integrity. In his discussion on cryptographic pro-
tection of storage, Stephen Kent described the plaintext-ciphertext block chaining
(PCBC) mode[17]. Figure 3-8 explains the structure of this mode. The nice feature
about PCBC is that one change in the ciphertext will affect the rest of the file after
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the change. The plaintext feedback propagates errors forward. This allows easy de-
tection of unauthorized modification when the integrity field is the last block, but it
also makes the storage much more brittle. One corrupted bit could ruin a file.
P1 P2 Pn
IV - - -- - Pn-1
IPI IP2
C1 CIn
key Block Cipher key Block Cipher key Block Cipher
C1 C2 Cn
Figure 3-8: In PCBC mode, C = the encryption of Pi ( IPi_1 ( Ci-1.
If we were not to use a hash tree, the entire file would need to be downloaded,
decrypted, and hashed in order to verify the integrity of just a single block. This
would seriously prevent efficient random access for file reads.
We could have used a plain cryptographic hash, rather than a keyed hash for
the integrity file of the file data. However, this requires that the plaintext remain
confidential. Since a chosen plaintext attack is easy to mount and the inode metadata
is not kept confidential, we kept the root of the AICF tree as a keyed hash.
Another alternative to a keyed hash is a digital signature. Our design tries to
avoid overuse of public key cryptography because it is significantly slower than most
symmetric key cryptography. However, we estimate that most files will not often
require re-signing because most large binary files are read-only.
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3.8.4 Delayed Re-encryption
Our initial design allowed parts of a file to be encrypted by many different keys.
That is, we would only re-encrypt a block with the new key if that block changed.
We opted for a simple scheme whereby the entire file is re-encrypted when the key
changes. If different blocks within a file can have different keys, our inode will have
an unbounded size and maintaining security will become more complex.
3.8.5 Buffer Cache
We considered three policies for cache consistency[4 1]. The simplest strategy, write
through, writes a block to the file server immediately. The block remains in the client's
cache for future reading. This achieves consistency, but does not reduce the amount
of encryption or number of writes to the file server. A second strategy, delayed write,
waits to write a block to the file server until the block is about to be ejected by the
replacement policy[27]. But a client may not see another client's changes immediately
- depending on timing. A third strategy, write-on-close, waits to flush buffers until a
file closes. For implementation reasons, we chose the delayed write strategy. However,
the third strategy would have a better balance between consistency and performance.
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Chapter 4
Implementation Details
We implemented Cepheus in Red Hat 5.1 with the Linux kernel version 2.0.34. The
implementation uses the standard Linux RPC package with the UDP protocol. For
the purpose of quickly getting most of the functionality to work, we made several
simplifications to the model of Cepheus. In particular, we integrated most of the user
agent and client daemon as one process. This allowed the file system to quickly come
online. The user gives the client daemon his or her secret key. To intercept file system
requests, the client daemon acts as an NFS loopback server for the 15 standard NFS
RPCs[24]. The NFS loopback client is built-in with the Linux kernel.
4.1 User Agent
We implemented most of the user agent functions in the client daemon. However,
the user agent still contains the command-line interface to maintain users and group
membership.
4.2 Client Daemon
The client daemon actually consists of two related processes. When the CD starts,
it forks into a user agent registration process and an NFS loopback process. The
CD.REGISTER and CDNFSLOOPBACK processes have shared memory and a file
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descriptor for message passing (see figure 4-1).
CD
UA. N CDREGISTER CD_NFS_LOOPBACK
UA Registration UA Plaintext Caches
Figure 4-1: The client daemon (CD) forks into two processes. CDREGISTER and
CDNFSLOOPBACK share memory for a registration data. The user agent (UA)
and CD-NFSLOOPBACK share memory for the buffer cache.
CD-REGISTER listens for new UAs and handles the mutual authentication of
the UA. The UA executes a file setgid to the group csf s to connect to a well-known,
named stream pipe for a UNIX domain socket. When a UA connects, CD-REGISTER
adds the UA to the state shared with CD-NFSLOOPBACK. For each registered
UA, this state includes a user ID (UID), semaphore on UID's buffer cache, pointer to
shared memory of UID's buffer cache, length of memory, and a pointer to the next
UA.
CD-NFSLOOPBACK listens for NFS RPCs from the local kernel. When a
request comes in, the CDNFSLOOPBACK determines the UID of the request
and sends a message to the appropriate (and already registered) UA. The UA and
CDNFSLOOPBACK share memory. In particular, they share memory of the buffer
cache. CDNFSILOOPBACK asks the UA to encrypt and decrypt this shared mem-
ory. In this way, the UA does not have to disclose its keys to the CD.
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NFS Loopback Server
There are a few tedious items to please the NFS loopback server. First, the client must
run a modified mountd. The mountd program responds to mount requests (e.g., mount
-t nf s localhost: /csf s /csf s). We use mountd only to please NFS semantics and
to get the initial file handle of the virtual file system, /csfs.
With mountd and the client daemon running, one simply types cd /csf s/hostname
to mount a remote Cepheus file server. The kernel notices that /csf s is a NFS
mount point and forwards the request to the client daemon. The daemon then checks
if /csf s/hostname is already mounted. If not, the client daemon connects to the
remote file server.
4.3 File Server
The file server offers 13 RPCs as mentioned in the previous chapter. Most of the
RPCs parallel that of the NFS RPCs. We require the RPC library to authenticate
the RPCs. The file server also has its own file system. We store an entire Cepheus
partition as a virtual disk. That is, we store the partition as a file in the standard
Linux file system.
Because the NFS loopback server is stateless, we have no way to determine if a
file is open or closed. Hence, we surrendered to using a delayed write policy instead
of the encrypt-on-close policy. Had we implemented Cepheus in the kernel, we could
detect a close operation. We expect a future version of Cepheus to operate partially
within the kernel.
4.4 Group Database Server
The group database server keeps lists of groups and the group keys. For key distri-
bution, a group owner sends the group key encrypted in each group member's public
key. While this does not scale well as group sizes increase, it greatly simplifies key
distribution and keys are not disclosed to the group database server itself.
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In addition to the AICF for file data, we must also authenticate the requests
themselves. For instance, the group database server must verify the authenticity and
authorization of an ADDUSER request. We had several options of where to place the
authentication:
9 In the RPC library
* In additional RPC arguments
* Embedded in arguments needing authentication and authorization
We chose the first case because it can easily authenticate the all the RPC argu-
ments. In the second case, the authentication mechanism is less transparent. More-
over, RPC already has a special argument for authentication. Had we chosen the
last case, we would only authenticate parts of an RPC request. We might forget
authentication of a seemingly innocent argument.
In SunRPC, each RPC request includes a generic authenticator. We simply use
a standard authentication protocol in place of the default authentication mechanism.
In security, it is better to err on the more secure side. By protecting all the arguments
in each RPC request, we guarantee the authenticity of the entire request.
4.5 Status
At this time of writing, most of the code is written. We still have to finish the buffer
cache on the client. Reads from the buffer cache work, but the delayed write policy
has not been implemented yet. Preliminary performance results give an optimistic
view of integrity protection of cryptographic storage. Amortized reads add very little
overhead compared to the network delays from NFS.
Cepheus borrowed parts of the code from the Secure File System[22]. The cryp-
tography involves the GNU multi-precision number package to handle public key
operations. We use the Rabin-Williams public key algorithm for signatures, SHA1
for cryptographic hashes, and RC5 for the block cipher.
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Figure 4-2: This picture shows the order of operations for emacs to read a block from
Cepheus. Step 8 actually goes across the network to the file server's kernel[16].
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Chapter 5
Questions for Cryptographic
Storage
In the course of designing Cepheus, we considered several questions regarding crypto-
graphic storage. In this chapter we briefly discuss some of the interesting questions.
5.1 Network Versus Storage Encryption
What are the advantages of cryptographic storage file systems versus those of cryp-
tographic network file systems? Cryptographic network file systems protect a link
between two end points and work securely if both end points are non-adversarial.
Cryptographic storage file systems protect a link from users to users and performs
well for read-only data. Cryptographic storage also separates confidentiality from
storage management[32].
The Secure File System by Dave Mazieres (same name as SFS, but different file
system) implements two kinds of cryptographic file services: read-only and read-
write[22]. Binary system files do not change often and therefore do not need to be
re-encrypted. Moreover, SFS uses client caching and time leases on files to offset the
cost of encryption. For read-only data, a cryptographic storage file system makes
more sense than a cryptographic network file system. A cryptographic storage file
system provides true end-to-end encryption. That is, user to user rather than user to
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file server.
5.2 File Permissions
The UNIX file system provides three kinds of access permissions: read, write, and
execute. An interesting problem exists when granting read access, but not write
access, in a cryptographic file system. If a single key protects a file, how does one
grant the ability to decrypt, but not modify and re-encrypt? One answer is to have
multiple keys, one for encryption/decryption and one for the AICF. A similar but
less harmful situation exists when a user has write access, but not read access (e.g.,
appending to a log file).
5.3 Group Sharing
How important is sharing for cryptographic storage? Sharing is uncommon, but adds
valuable functionality if designed well[38]. Group sharing in the UNIX file system is
not well suited to network file systems. If you have a stand-alone machine, it is easy to
use groups. You edit /etc/group as necessary. But in NFS, system administrators
must intervene for all group membership changes: creating a group, adding group
members, removing group members, and so on. In the Andrew File System (AFS),
users take advantage of group sharing because there is minimal intervention by system
administrators. We would like to see a cryptographic storage file system that uses
access control lists rather than the permissions in the UNIX file system.
The semantics of group sharing is also unclear. For instance, who owns a group?
The question in the UNIX file system is mute: root owns and maintains the groups.
But in a cryptographic file system, we need to redefine group ownership and group
administration abilities. Users must take on roles previously held by omnipotent
system administrators.
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5.4 Incremental Cryptography
Incremental methods could help alleviate some of the burden of encryption[43]. In-
cremental encryption can speed up file encryption because most files are created by
people who tend to follow patterns. Such patterns include appending more often
than modifying files, reading more often than writing, creating small files, and not
sharing too often[34]. Most files are decrypted more often than encrypted. In the
case of public key cryptography, the decryption should be made to run faster than the
encryption. Unfortunately, the UNIX file system does not operate in an incremental
fashion. The UNIX file system does not allow inserts as does a database. To fully ex-
ploit incremental cryptography, we may need to implement security at the application
level[43]. However, incrementally changing keys may alleviate costs of re-encryption
in cryptographic storage file systems. Incremental methods would require significant
changes to the file system interface.
5.5 Delayed Re-encryption
What consistency problems are expected from delayed encryption? Cepheus uses
delayed writes and delayed re-encryption to avoid unnecessary encryption. Problems
could arise if a set of files has not been fully re-encrypted after two key changes in a
row. Should the file system wait until the first re-encryption finishes? There may be
other ways to delay or avoid encryption. For instance, one could throttle the amount
of encryption.
5.6 Integrity
The XFS file system from Silicon Graphics uses an adaptive approach to storing file
data[40]. B+ trees keep the every file structure balanced. A similar strategy could
reduce the average running time for creation and validation of integrity fields. For
instance, we could reorganize the hash tree structure of the AICF such that data that
changes often tends to affect the same path in the tree.
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5.7 Orphaned Directories
An orphaned directory results when two directories with a parental relationship have
different cryptographic keys. This is best illustrated by an example. Consider a
directory /home and a subdirectory /home/fubob. Recall that a directory maps file
names to inode numbers. To list the contents of the /home/fubob directory, the
file system must first locate the inode for /home by reading the contents of the /
directory1 . With the inode for /home, the file system can read the directory contents
to find the mapping from /home/fubob to another inode. Finally, the file system uses
the inode for /home/fubob to list the directory contents.
Now assume that different cryptographic keys protect the /home and /home/fubob
directories. The following table results:
Have /home/fubob key Not have /home/fubob key
Have /home key Access to both directories Access to /home
Not have /home key Undefined No access
Table 5.1: Access depending on available keys. When a user has the key to a directory,
but not to its parent directory, access semantics are undefined.
Having the key for /home/fubob is useless if the key for /home is not available.
There would be no way to locate the inode for /home/fubob. A cryptographic file
system will have to define the access semantics under such cases. To have directory
access independent from a parent directory, the file system cannot secure directory
contents.
5.8 Brittleness
How can we avoid making the file system brittle[32]? If someone forgets a password,
data may be lost. A single bit error can render a file useless under some chaining
techniques[32]. We need to take extra precautions to avoid accidentally losing data.
Data recovery and the ordering of operations is important. This thesis did not con-
centrate on the issue of brittleness, mainly because it is an extremely hard problem.
'For bootstrapping, the / directory has a hard-coded inode number.
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5.9 Encrypted Swap File
How useful is an encrypted swap file? Once power is lost, the swap file could be
quickly purged by forgetting the key. We have yet to find much documentation of
encrypted swap files.
5.10 Key Rings
Where should keys be stored? We do not want to lose our keys, but we also do not
want to carry large key rings. Cepheus uses the authorization server as a central
repository for keys. But users could modify the user agent to use a local key ring.
Key rings are more easily stolen, but a repository becomes a central point of failure.
5.11 Trust of System Administrator
Can integrity and availability be achieved without trusting the file server? With
public key cryptography, we can separate integrity from storage management. But
we have yet to find a way to separate availability from storage management. It seems
obvious that the two are inseparable, but there could be a way to partially separate
availability from storage management.
5.12 Unattended Access
How can daemon processes access encrypted areas of a disk? Should they? To print
a postscript document, you must use 1pr. Your file travels across the network to the
printer in the clear. Can and should unattended programs be able to safely acquire
cryptographic keys without user intervention? What are the end points?
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Cepheus provides confidentiality of file data and directory contents. It also maintains
integrity and availability of file data, directory contents, and metadata. Cepheus
implements a secure group sharing mechanism. If file systems become more ACL-
based, we expect sharing to become more common.
We introduced delayed re-encryption. File owners can re-key a file while letting
group members perform the re-encryption. A plaintext and ciphertext buffer cache
uses a delayed write strategy to avoid unnecessary re-encryption.
In order for cryptographic storage to be widely used, cryptographic file systems
will need to be compatible with existing file system interfaces. Moreover, the cryp-
tographic file system must be at least as good as existing file systems in speed and
functionality. The author also discovered that adding cryptography to a file sys-
tem complicates the design several times over! In the future, we expect to develop
Cepheus into a fully functional system. Moreover, we hope to use an asynchronous
RPC package to process requests more efficiently.
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